Chapter2

But the transition to collectivized agriculture was far from simple. The unproven forcing of the tempo, the usual administrative methods of leadership, coarse violations of the principle of voluntariness, and distortions of the (party) line in relation to the middle peasant during the struggle against the kulaks greatly complicated the situation in the village. There was also an unforseen drought. All this made conditions ripe for serious food supply difficulties in late 1932 and early 1933, and in a number of rural localities even famine. 74

This was a signal to official Soviet Ukrainian historians that it was now permissible to be somewhat more forthcoming in dealing with the Ukrainian famine. If nothing else, it was the first time that a Soviet Politburo member has publicly referred to 1933 as the year of the Famine.
An indication of how far Soviet Ukrainian historians might go was a January 1988 article by Stanislav Kulchytsky in News from Ukraine, published in English by the Ukraina Society, an organization for cultural relations with Ukrainians abroad.

Kulchytsky began by claiming that the famine of 1921 was worse than that of 1933 because of state policy, “Fortunately, owing to the measures taken by the state, the famine of the early 1930s was prevented from reaching the scope of the previous one.” The author restated several conservative positions: First, that the collectivization of agriculture was historically necessary; second, that the Spring 1930 campaign against distortions “put an end” to forcing peasants into collective farms; and third, that peasant sloth and irresponsibility were much to blame for falling agricultural production. Despite the supposedly voluntary nature of collectivization after March 1930, Kulchytsky admitted that “peasants who became members of collective farms were not completely convinced in the advantages of collective labor over individual one.” He continued:

Man’s psychology cannot be changed by decree, so the petty peasants who joined the collective farms were distinguished for their poor discipline, at times irresponsible attitude to common cattle, squandering of collective property, indifference to everything beyond their private plots. If one adds to this the organizational disorder which was a natural result of the lack of experience in collective management, we will get a clear-cut picture of the real difficulties. 75

Kulchytsky also declared:

During the purchasing (i.e., procurements) campaign of 1931 top authorities demanded from the leaders of districts and villages that the plans be fulfilled at any cost, though those plans were unstable. Unaware of the real state of affairs in localities, the republican (i.e., Ukrainian SSR) bodies often increased the planned targets. At the same time, the local authorities failed to see real potentialities of the collective farms. As a result, seed resources were frequently taken away even from the collective farms which overfulfilled the set targets. 76

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74 “Pid praporom Velykoho Zhovtnia, kursom perebudova dopovid’ chlena Politburo TsK KPRS,
pershoho sekretaria TsK Kompartii Ukrainy V. V. SHCHERBYTS’KOHO na urochystomu zasidanni
prysviachenomu 70-richchiu vstanovlennia Radians’koi vlady na Ukraini, 25 hrudnia 1987 roku”
(Under the Banner of Great October along a Course of Transformation: Report of CPSU Politburo
Member and CPU First Secretary V. V. Shcherbyts’kyi at a Ceremonial Meeting in Honor of the 70th Anniversary of the Establishment of Soviet Power in Ukraine, December 25, 1987), Molod* Ukrainy (Ukraine’s Youth), December 26,1987, p. 2.

75 Stanislav Kulchytsky, “Historical Experience: Vital Today,” News From Ukraine 1988, No. 2, p. 7.

76 Ibid.