Chapter 1

The disruptions growing out of collectivization led to the famine and the death of millions of peasants. Obviously this is not a point that the Soviet leaders would wish to emphasize. And, in fact, they did such a good job of suppressing knowledge of it that few today know of the famine, and even some otherwise well-informed students of the Soviet Union suggest that the famine was of little consequence.

He then set out “to clarify the record by presenting a comprehensive, documented view of the man-made famine of 1932-1934.” 90

Dalrymple surveyed in concise and readable fashion the various press accounts, Western scholarly literature, mortality estimates which averaged out to 5.5 million, and some of the more vivid eyewitness accounts. By examining crop and procurement figures it was rather easy to show that the Famine had been caused by the state’s seizure of the crop and its refusal to allow relief into the stricken areas. Dalrymple did not examine the issue of nationality policy, and he seems to have given rather excessive credence to reports which indicated that the Famine continued into 1934 and perhaps even later. 91

Perhaps Dalrymple’s most original contribution was his analysis of the reasons behind official efforts to conceal the Famine:

Why did the Soviets choose to hide the famine of 1932-1934? Was it because they thought they might be under some pressure to cut off exports if they admitted the famine and invited relief? Not likely. In the autumn of 1922 ‘…Moscow authorities announced their intention of exporting food and at the same time asked foreign relief for four million Russians.’ The purpose—as ten years later—was to buy machinery for industrialization. And even then the policy was not new: Food had been exported, and relief accepted during the famines of 1911, 1906, and 1891.
Were the Soviets afraid of the disruptive influence of foreigners…? Again the answer is probably no. There were a number of Americans already in the country doing technical assistance work, and there were a number of foreign agricultural concessions; all, it would seem, without any particular disruptive influence…
The reasons for the Soviets’ desire to hide the famine must lie elsewhere. One possibility has already been suggested: The Soviet desire to beat the last of the resistance out of the peasants and to complete the drive into the socialized farms. If the government were to acknowledge the famine and accept relief (it could not very well admit famine and refuse famine aid at the same time) it would mean in effect a concession to the peasants. But since the government was effectively at war with the peasants, this was a compromise that they would not readily make.
Another, and perhaps equally important reason may center about the matter of keeping face. The Soviets had been trying to spread the story of the economic and social triumph of the first Soviet five-year plan. To admit the presence of a terrible famine at the conclusion of the plan would have hardly been the sort of triumphal conclusion that the leaders might have desired…
But more than prestige may have been involved. The Soviets at about this time were working for (a) diplomatic recognition by the United States, (b) admission into the League of Nations, and (c) ‘non-aggression’ agreements with various European nations. If the story of the famine were made better known, Russia’s cause would not have been enhanced—both because the famine was essentially man-made, and because the Russians had done practically nothing to alleviate it
Relying mainly upon the accounts published by Malcolm Muggeridge and Eugene Lyons, Dalrymple described how the Soviets were able to suppress the

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90 Dana Dalrymple, The Soviet Famine of 1932-1934,” Soviet Studies, XV:3, January 1964, p. 250.
91 Ibid, pp. 250-284.
92 Ibid, pp. 277-278.