Non-Soviet Scholarship on the Ukrainian Famine

Kostiuk described the intense struggle which accompanied collectivization in Ukraine, the breakdown of agriculture which led to outbreaks of hunger in the early months of 1932, and the confrontation between the Ukrainian party leadership and Stalin’s representatives at the Third All-Ukrainian Party Conference in July 1932. Kostiuk pointed also to a series of political events in 1932 which showed the growing tension between Moscow and the Ukrainian Communists. Some of the most important on the side of self-assertion were the following:

1) The triumphant (January—JM) celebration of the sixtieth birthday of Skrypnyk, “the undying Bolshevik, one of the best representatives of the old Leninist guard, one of the best fighters and builders of the Soviet Socialist Ukraine.” All this—with no mention of Stalin.
2) The clearly demonstrative decision of the Ukrainian Economic Council on July 14,1992 (six days after the Third Party Conference), modifying the decree of the Soviet of People’s Commissars of the USSR dated June 29, 1932, concerning the deliveries of butter in the Ukraine. According to this modification, the original target of 16,400 tons of butter was reduced to 11,214 tons.
3) Chubar’s (September-JM) speech at the Komsomol conference in Kharkov, pleading for more freedom and decentralization.
4) The surge of local pride in the construction in Ukraine of Dniprelstan—the first giant power station in the USSR. 81

On the other hand, CP(b)U compliance with Moscow’s orders for drastic measures to fulfill the quota is shown by

1) The (November—JM) directive “to organize immediately the return of grain distributed (to the peasants), and to direct it toward the fulfillment of grain deliveries.”
2) The (December—JM) sanctioning of the complete surrender of the seed supplies of the kolkhozes,
3) Threats to arrest and liquidate lower officials of the kolkhozes. 82

The struggle reached a major turning point in January with Stalin’s appointment of Postyshev as CP(b)U Second Secretary and his virtual occupation of Ukraine with thousands of new men sent by Moscow. Kostiuk wrote:

The purpose of Stalin’s offensive against the Ukraine was not only to force collectivization upon the recalcitrant and stubborn peasants. His plan was grand and far-reaching in scope. It was to destroy the spiritual and cultural backbone of the entire nation, as well as to terrorize the peasantry. Without this complete annihilation of spiritual resources and cultural achievements, Stalin’s victory in Ukraine could never be complete. Realizing this, he decided to unleash all the forces of devastation at his disposal against those who stood for an independent Ukrainian culture, tradition and consciousness, even though they were devoted Communists. 83

Kostiuk refrained from arguing the existence of a pre-conceived plan to create a famine, while also avoiding the trap into which Holubnychy and so many non-Ukrainian scholars fell—dealing with the Famine apart from Soviet nationality policy. His strict adherence to the evidence serves as a model for subsequent work.

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81 Ibid., pp. 24-25.
82 Ibid, p. 25.
83 lbid,p.38.