Chapter 1

writers could be found who either described the situation in 1933 as one of semi-starvation or dismissed the Famine altogether. He cited some of the more important non-Ukrainian accounts then available and cogently argued the basic points in order to show that the Famine had been initiated and organized by Stalin as a genocidal manifestation of nationality policy:

1) Even many Russian writers conceded that the Famine affected
not Russia but areas peripheral to it such as Ukraine and the North
Caucasus.
2) The majority of the victims were poor and middle peasants (bedniaky and seredniaky) who had already joined the collective farms.
3) Moscow made the crucial decisions responsible for the Famine—procurement quotas, the August 1932 law on protecting socialist property, the unprecedented guarding of grain stores—which were instituted for the first time at the very beginning of the 1932 harvest and never repeated.
4) Those farms in Ukraine which met their initial quota were merely assigned supplementary procurement quotas until there was nothing left
5) No help was allowed the starving from any quarter, even when it would have cost the government nothing.
6) Every effort was made to conceal the existence of starvation from the outside world.
7) Simultaneously the Ukrainian intelligentsia underwent mass liquidation.37

While this does not necessarily prove the Famine was planned beforehand, it does indicate that one of the ends it served was that of nationality policy.
Solovey also deserves particular credit for compiling such sketchy information as does exist about incidents of rural resistance to the grain procurements that took place in 1932-1933:

Larger or smaller disturbances in response to the famine of 1932-33, as shall be seen, were numerous. Even in those years I myself could not avoid hearing from certain sources about the sacking of the grain depot at Sahaidak station (Poltava region) by the starving, who tore it apart. Quite recently I chanced upon a mention in the press of a similar destruction of a bread depot at Hoholeve station (Myrhorod region). A. S. Pidhainy recounts a real revolt of starving peasants in his account of the Solovetsky exile of Ivan Kozlov (see above—JM)…
Similarly Lev Orryhora in his 1946 cycle Na sud istorii (Before the Court of History) writes that in the village of Klenove (Bohodukhy district, Kharkiv Oblast) “swollen peasants (men, women, and children) armed with pitchforks, rakes, and iron hardware” nightly attacked a state distillery which had a large quantity of corn in storage which it systematically turned into spirits. And the factory was defended by 300 secret police troops. Yet, “every attack ended with killed and wounded on both sides.”38

……………………….

37 Dmytro Solovei, Holhota Ukrainy: moskovs’ko-bol’shevyts’kyi okupatsiinyi teror v URSR mizh pershoiu i druhoiu svitovoiu viinoiu (The Golgotha of Ukraine: Moscow’s Bolshevik Occupation Terror in the Ukrainian SSR between the First and Second World Wars) (Winnipeg, Ukrains’kyi holos, 1954), pp. 174-243.

38 Ibid., pp. 141-142.